The present study was commissioned by the Department of Defense in order to obtain a command evaluation of the operation in time to make its lessons available for current planning, and does not attempt to be definitive either in scope or in statistics. Attention was deliberately focused on the evacuation, reception, and re-entry phases, since these were the distinctive features of Carla. Apology must be made for the relative neglect of other more conventional aspects of the disaster--the functioning of Government agencies and control centers, military aid, industrial planning, the tremendous work of public and private agencies--each meriting a history itself. Unexpectedly, the study also produced material of interest in the field of shelter management. Although Carla's refugees were in ordinary housing, not fallout shelters, many of the lessons in group behavior and sanitation appeared strikingly applicable. The views expressed are those of the dozens of State and local officials who directed Carla operations, and who were kind enough to give their name and help to the Department of Defense soon afterward. Gratitude and acknowledgment are due to all of them, as listed by name in an appendix.